How did constructions of a People's Europe, close to its citizens, fare in the public spheres of the member-states? What counter-constructions did they face of what made political authority (in general, and for the growing authority of the re-named 'European Union' in particular) legitimate and desirable? This chapter turns the focus to the national level. It explores how what it made sense to say about the EU and its legitimacy in France and Germany changed at a moment of exceptionally intense debate on integration, that is, around the negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992 and in force from November 1993. The chapter covers the French and German public (media and political) debates on Maastricht, as reflected in their national presses from the beginning of 1991 to the end of 1993.
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With a view to the book as a whole, the purpose of this chapter is to juxtapose representations of integration and the EU in national public spheres with the foundational legitimation discourses and critical counter-discourses discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, as well as with the official legitimation techniques around the People's Europe discussed in Chapter 3 and the EU-official post-Maastricht discursive crisis management analysed in Chapter 5 . This will allow us to reflect on how specific discourses travelled between these levels, and whether there ever was any chance of discourses around Union citizenship, greater EP powers, transparency, subsidiarity, or governance, for example, finding resonance in the French and German public spheres, given entrenched shared understandings there of what constitutes legitimate political authority. The chapter's more immediate objective, however, is to assess what 'Maastricht' meant for the EU's struggle for legitimacy. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was a defining moment in the fortunes of European integration on many levels. As to the legitimacy issue, the common understanding in both academia and political discourse is that it ushered in the EU's much cited 'legitimacy crisis', which has since turned into somewhat of a permanent condition (see Chapter 5 ). Specifically, the treaty had three types of implications for the EU's legitimacy.
Firstly, in terms of its content, the treaty significantly expanded the EU's competences. This in itself constituted an unprecedented legitimation challenge. Most importantly, the treaty committed the Twelve to introducing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 1999, that is, to giving up their national currencies and monetary policies in favour of common European ones. It furthermore extended EU competence to new areas, including education, culture, public health, and consumer protection, and gave a treaty basis to intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs and a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the language of the People's Europe discourse, all these new powers equipped the new EU with means to meet its citizens' needs and desires more effectively. At the same time, giving the EU so much more power, including over people's wallets, of course had to be legitimated itself. In Germany, Die Zeit 's Editor-in-Chief, Helmut Schmidt, cited Ralph Dahrendorf: as long as the EC had been only marginal, its democratic deficit could be dismissed as irritating but not seriously problematic. With integration progressing, or even only the prospect of it, this was no longer working (DZ 30/04/1993) . A number of innovations introduced by the Maastricht Treaty had taken up longstanding demands in discourses about input-related legitimacy (see Chapters 1 and 7), including the introduction of Union citizenship, and the strengthening of the European Parliament's powers through the co-decision, assent, and cooperation procedures. Yet, as I will suggest in this chapter, these intended legitimacy-enhancing measures likewise turned into legitimation liabilities, given that they went against the grain of a number of specific deeply rooted, resilient, as well as diverse and dynamic ideas in the member-states about what makes political, and specifically European, authority justifiable. In short, much of what was supposed to make the EU more legitimate and even more of a fixture in the economic and political life of Europe -not least by making it considerably more powerful -effectively posed a major test to the EU's legitimacy.
